




Abstract— Fieldbus networks have been assuming a high 
acceptance in the industrial environment, replacing the old 
centralized control architectures. Due to time critical nature 
of the tasks involved in these environments, the fulfillment of 
dependability attributes is usually required. Therefore the de-
pendability is an important parameter on system design, 
which should be evaluated. 
Several factors can affect system dependability. The envi-
ronmental ones are the most common and due to the particu-
larity of the industrial environment this susceptibility is in-
creased. In this paper it is proposed a framework based on 
fault injection techniques, supported by a hardware platform 
which emulates a fault set, representative of industrial envi-
ronment scenarios, intending to disturb data communications 
on a PROFIBUS network. From these fault injection experi-
ments, relevant data is gathered and a further analysis is car-
ried out to evaluate dependability attributes. 
 
Index Terms—Fieldbus, Dependability, Fault Injection, 
Profibus. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays fieldbuses have a prominent role in industrial 
automation systems with large application domains which 
extend to almost every area in manufacturing and process 
industries. They are presently the backbone of distributed 
industrial control systems, providing a communication in-
frastructure, which supports the execution of control, moni-
toring and supervision applications [1]. 
Dependability attributes like availability, reliability and 
safety, have become essential parameters on industrial 
automation systems design. Economic benefits of a de-
pendable system include less lost production, higher prod-
uct quality, reduced maintenance costs and lower risks [2]. 
In such systems a dependable behavior can only be accom-
plished if the communication infrastructure is also depend-
able. 
Industrial environments are characterized by the exis-
tence of high diversity of equipments that are sources of 
large patterns of electrical and electromagnetic interference 
which can induce faults on existing electronics systems. In 
data communication systems this could lead to data signal 
destruction and cause erroneous states at transceivers and 
other electronics circuits. Most of these systems have fault 
tolerant mechanisms (e.g. CRC, retransmissions) which are 
able to cope most of those situations. Nevertheless, there 
are fault scenarios that cannot be handled, enabling fault 
propagation, which could lead to a complete system failure. 
In this context, an evaluation of fieldbus networks 
should be performed, enabling the identification of the most 
important parameters from a dependability viewpoint. 
 
In this paper the behavior of a fieldbus network under 
fault scenarios is addressed, focusing on PROFIBUS-DP 
which is a widely used and accepted fieldbus, oriented for 
communications in small cell networks and designed for 
cycle data fast exchange with field devices. 
The present paper is structured as follows: In section II 
dependability evaluation context is discussed. In section III 
it is given a description of the PROFIBUS network. A brief 
discussion of the related work on dependability, inaccessi-
bility and performance degradation of PROFIBUS is given 
in section IV. In section V a fault injection framework is 
proposed, where dependability parameters and performance 
metrics of the interest to the proposed work are identified. 
The hardware platform to support this analysis is described 
in section VI. In Section VII the use of analytical models 
for dependability evaluation is briefly discussed. Finally 
conclusions are presented in section VIII. 
II. DEPENDABILITY EVALUATION CONTEXT 
The design, development and operation of a dependable 
system can be achieved by combined utilization of a set of 
methods and techniques [3], which can be grouped in the 
following classes: 
• Fault prevention, to anticipate the possibility of 
fault introduction or occurrence. 
• Fault tolerance, to enable the fulfilling of the sys-
tem service in spite of faults. 
• Fault removal, by reducing the number and sever-
ity of faults.  
• Fault forecasting, to estimate the present number, 
future incidence and consequences of system 
faults. 
Dependability evaluation is a necessary process to verify 
the conformity of the system behavior with its specifica-
tion. To certify system dependability it is necessary to sub-
mit it to a validation process. This process can be per-
formed through two viewpoints: verification techniques and 
forecasting techniques. 
Dependability verification techniques are based on fault 
injection methods. They consist on an accomplishment of a 
set of controlled experiments, where faults are intentionally 
injected into the system in order to analyze its behavior re-
lated with fault conditions. These faults emulate unex-
pected events that may occur in the system operation and 
enable either purging design faults – by fault removal, or 
obtaining data to feed dependability evaluation models – by 
fault forecasting. 
Techniques to perform fault forecasting are developed 
through assessment of system behavior with respect to fault 
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activation and occurrence. When this assessment is per-
formed through system modeling, a formal mathematical 
representation of the system is developed and solved to 
evaluate system dependability attributes. 
Sections V and VII discuss respectively the use of the 
previous techniques to evaluate PROFIBUS dependability. 
III. THE PROFIBUS 
The PROFIBUS is a fieldbus network oriented to inter-
connect low level control devices such as Programmable 
Logical Controllers (PLC), Numerical Controllers (NC) and 
raw field devices (e.g. sensors and actuators) [4]. 
The transmission medium is a shielded twisted pair ca-
ble. The maximum network length and data rate are respec-
tively 1200m and 12Mb. Both are interrelated. 
The PROFIBUS network contains masters and slave sta-
tions, also referred as active and passive ones. Active sta-
tions transfer their own messages without requesting a re-
mote station. In contrast, a passive station only accesses the 
bus on request of an active station. This behaviour is ac-
complished by use of a hybrid access method: a decentral-
ised one according to the Token Passing principle and sub-
ordinated centrally according to the Master-Slave principle. 
The active stations are responsible for building and 
maintaining the logical ring. The bus access is gained when 
a station possesses the token. The token is passed from ac-
tive to active stations in ascending address mode, except for 
the High Station Address (HAS) that passes the token to the 
lowest address active station. So each active station knows 
the address of its predecessor station (PS) and the address 
of the next station (NS). The communication process is ini-
tiated after an active station receives the token. 
The PROFIBUS establishes two priorities for the mes-
sages: high and low priority messages. Possessing the to-
ken, an active station is allowed to transmit messages dur-
ing a well-established time (Holding Time). The high prior-
ity messages are transmitted first. If an active station re-
ceives a token with negative holding time it will be allowed 
to transmit only one high priority message. 
The Holding Time results from arithmetic difference be-
tween Target Rotation Time (TTR) and Real Rotation Time 
(TRR). TTR is a set point that must be into account the time 
needed for transmitting high and low priority messages and 
maintenance ones. TRR is obtained from the last two recep-
tion of the token by an active station.  
IV. RELATED WORK 
According to application domain, fieldbus networks 
have to fulfill time constrains imposed by control laws 
where they provide its communication services. 
This problem is firstly addressed to analysis of a pre-
runtime communication scheduling conditions, which guar-
antee that control laws are totally respected by fulfilling the 
associated deadlines. Nevertheless, the time guidelines for 
building this schedule are based on performability charac-
teristics of the filedbus system, excluding any fault scenar-
ios [5].  
Several analyses of PROFIBUS real-time behaviour are 
made based on performance protocol features. In [6] a per-
formance evaluation of the PROFIBUS in distributed com-
puter control systems is made by means of an experimental 
model. The message time delay is evaluated as function of 
their length, generation time and the Token Rotation Time 
(TTR) on a PROFIBUS FMS, a subset of the PROFIBUS 
protocol. A methodology to set the TTR in order to make the 
PROFIBUS response time to adhere to the real-time dis-
tributed applications requirements is presented in [7]. 
Design of real-time applications can get important bene-
fits from this approach, but a gap on the knowledge of its 
behavior in faulty scenarios still remains. This fact could 
lead application designers to assume a worst-case scenario 
that cannot be necessarily the same one that occurs in pres-
ence of faults. In this way it always exist a probability of 
not fulfilling the system deadlines, which can lead to a sys-
tem failure. 
Most of faults which affect the communication infra-
structure lead to inaccessibility problems, degrading the 
communication performance. The problem of the inacces-
sibility of fieldbus networks is addressed in [8]. In this 
work an analytical study of the inaccessibility of CAN and 
PROFIBUS is presented. The worst-case inaccessibility due 
to station insertion, station failure and bit error are derived. 
As suggestion it is considered important the analysis of a 
general performability of CAN and PROFIBUS by means 
of a tool, to evaluate the inaccessibility phenomena, under 
complex fault scenarios. 
In [9] the proprieties of PROFIBUS MAC (Medium Ac-
cess Control) protocol over error prone links are analysed. 
Several metrics of the ring stability are captured by simula-
tion. The results show high ring instability when the 
PROFIBUS MAC operates over high error prone medium 
as the used ones by the wireless communications.  
The previous works show that the behavior of 
PROFIBUS protocol it is fully characterized from the view-
point of the necessary conditions to achieve real-time 
communication scenarios. But this behavior when submit-
ted to fault conditions was not yet fully addressed. There-
fore, it becomes relevant to provide means to lack this ab-
sence by establishing a methodology that enables to evalu-
ate the protocol behavior in those fault scenarios. 
In this paper it is proposed a framework based on fault 
injection techniques, supported by a hardware platform 
which emulates a fault set representative of industrial envi-
ronment scenarios, affecting directly data communications 
on PROFIBUS networks. From these fault injection ex-
periments, relevant data is gathered and a further analysis is 
carried out to evaluate dependability attributes. 
V. FAULT INJECTION FRAMEWORK 
A fault injection framework needs to be researched in 
order to identify and characterize a set of faults representa-
tive of abnormal operation of PROFIBUS.  
Protocol behaviour can be affected by faults, which oc-
curs frequently either at bus or at transceivers. At the bus, 




ternal factor that leads to inconsistency of the information 
conveyed. This affects two main groups of frames:  
• Token Frames, which are used to manage the logi-
cal ring. Faults at these frames could produce errors 
at token passing and loss of the token that could 
lead to ring instability [9]. 
• Action/Reply Frames, which are used to exchange 
data between stations. Faults at these frames could 
delay the data exchange process until a maximum 
number of retries, or to make it impracticable. 
At transceivers, faults can be both permanent and tran-
sient. Permanent faults are associated to continuous mal-
function of a transceiver. Transient faults cause a temporary 
effect on a transceiver and can be the result of noise or an-
other electrical disturb. Faults at transceivers have high im-
pact on the related station. In order to detect abnormal be-
haviour of transceivers, the protocol read back bit by bit the 
token frames transmitted by the station. In case of two con-
secutive errors on the token frame read back, the protocol 
assumes a defective transceiver and leaves the logical ring. 
For a given scenario the pre-run time scheduling estab-
lishes the time restrictions that must be fulfilled by the 
communication system. The restrictions appear as dead-
lines, which represent the time bound to complete the com-
munication service. The deadline should consider all times 
components to complete the message cycle. It includes 
queuing time and others latencies that occurs at active and 
passive stations and transmission medium, on end to end 
communication process. This time must be minor or equal 
to a bounded time witch is known as the worst-case execu-
tion time (WCET). 
In this context, the analysis of fault effects on the fulfil-
ment of the WCET on PROFIBUS-DP is an important re-
search topic of the present work, and therefore the WCET 
fault coverage it is considered an important metric that 
should be experimentally evaluated. The WCET fault cov-
erage is the probability of the fulfilment of the deadlines 
imposed by the control laws which support system opera-
tion, when this is affected by a given fault. 
In order to analyze the impact of those faults on the 
WCET fault coverage, it is necessary to produce a set of 
statistical independent experiments, in respect to each one 
of the identified faults. In those experiments, faults are in-
jected according to a probabilistic distribution established 
according to real fault scenarios. The number of violations 
of the WCET is computed for a given fault scenario, and 
from that the WCET fault coverage is obtained. 
To perform the previous experiments a hardware plat-
form is necessary. Although physical fault injection in the 
bus can be performed be using a simple transceiver probe, 
it becomes difficult to collect the necessary data to evaluate 
fault coverage if standard equipment is used (e.g. PLCs), 
since the access to the protocol stack it normally hidden. 
Therefore, it was necessary to develop a special node, full 
compatible with the PROFIBUS protocol and totally in-
strumented, enabling the gathering of the necessary data. 
VI. HARDWARE PLATFORM 
In this section the hardware platform to support fault in-
jection on the PROFIBUS network is presented. It is com-
posed by an injector module, a monitor module and 
PROFIBUS-DP communication nodes. Communication 
nodes are part of communication infrastructure. Injector 




































Figure 1- Hardware Platform 
Communication Infrastructure 
The communication infrastructure provides a test bed for 
intended dependability experiments. The network is a set of 
EM277 PROFIBUS-DP slaves from Siemens and masters 
and slaves based on DSTni-LX-002 microcontroller from 
Lantronix. 
The DSTni-LX is a complete communication single chip 
solution that features high performance Turbo-186 com-
patible microprocessor and features a wide range of on-chip 
peripherals to support the most popular embedded network-
ing technologies. The communication channels includes: 
Ethernet MAC, Dual CAN, PROFIBUS, SPI, and Dual Se-
rial ports to handle the most demanding embedded applica-
tions. DSTni-LX implements the ASPC2 ASIC from Sie-
mens. The ASPC2 is the MAC that carries out the bus pro-
tocol of the Data Link Layer (DLL). The interface service 
and management functions of the DLL are handled by soft-
ware. The node configuration allows easy access to DLL 
and user interface, allowing collection relevant data to de-
pendability experiments.  
Fault Injection Setup 
A capability to inject faults in the communication infra-
structure is necessary in order to carry out experiments. 
This capability is achieved by the use of dedicated modules 
that are connected to the communication infrastructure. The 
modules are an injector and a monitor. 
The injector is a dedicated module oriented to inject 




ceiver witch acts as an injection prove. This transceiver is 
commanded by a microcontroller that has the role to per-
form the fault injection activities in a controlled way. The 
injector can perform either asynchronous or synchronous 
fault injections. In order to execute a synchronous fault in-
jection it is needed to supply the injector with bus informa-
tion. This is achieved through permanent observation of the 
bus activity.  
The monitor module has the mission to register all rele-
vant events on the bus, mainly to verify the fault activation 
and fault effect at the bus. It is based on a transceiver con-
trolled by a dedicated CPU. 
Monitor and injector are modules oriented to manage 
bus injection faults. To inject faults on a transceiver it is 
necessary to design a node with dedicated hardware. This 
hardware is then commanded by the microcontroller that 
sends signals to direction bits to emulate faults either at re-
ception or transmission of the transceiver. 
In order to facilitate the management of the experimental 
platform, an Ethernet connection between all members of 
experimental platform and a computer host is established. 
This allows uploading of all information collected on fault 
injection experiments to the host computer and download-
ing of fault injection camping files to the injector module. 
Fault Injection Experiments 
Experiments are performed according to the physical 
fault injection approach [10]. It consists on the application 
of physical faults by imposing an electrical level to the 
physical device - e.g. stuck-at-0, stuck-at-1 and bit flips. 
The injector module uses the bit flip in order to corrupt the 
information conveyed in the digital signal. Faults are placed 
at two levels: 
• Bus Level: to emulate the corruption of the 
PROFIBUS frames due to external factors such as 
electromagnetic interference. It allows at focusing 
the corruption of action/reply and token frames. 
• Physical Level: with this kind of fault it is possi-
ble to emulate malfunctions of the transceiver. 
These faults are in respect to transceiver function 
of transmitting and receiving. 
For each fault injection experiment, the behavior of the 
system is observed to determine whether or not faults have 
any impact on the system. This is done from two view-
points:  
• At the bus, by monitoring the communication bus 
and verifying whether or not the fault corrupts a 
message on the bus. 
• At the communication nodes, by registering the 
outputs of the PROFIBUS MAC interface 
(ASPC2). 
At communication nodes the main goal is to verify the 
fulfillment of deadlines, thus the ending time of a message 
cycle is the most important information. In order to obtain 
information about the protocol behavior a set of informa-
tion supplied by special registers of ASPC2 are collected. 
The results could be used to sustain conclusions about the 
fault effects on WCET and other dependability analysis 
(e.g. latency and dormancy). This includes:  
• Detected faults by the MAC fault tolerance 
mechanisms such as: Double Token, Pass-Token 
error, HSA-error, Sync-Error, Response error, etc. 
• MAC states: Hold-Token, Listen-Token, Not 
Hold-Token. 
Since the experiments are occurring on a distributed sys-
tem, it is important to maintain the consistence of the col-
lect data. Therefore it is necessary to guarantee time syn-
chronization of all communication modules in relation to 
the experimental data, and time stamping of the collected 
events.  
Finally all data is collected on the host computer and put 
available for analysis process, enabling the computation of 
the respective dependability attributes. 
VII. DEPENDABILITY EVALUATION MODELING  
Dependability evaluation by using fault forecasting tech-
niques is performed from two viewpoints: 
• Qualitative in which are identified and classified 
the system failure modes according their attributes 
(e.g. cause, effect, critically, quality of service, 
etc.) and the event combinations that could lead to 
a system failure. 
• Quantitative in which measures of dependability 
attributes, as reliability, availability, safety and 
performability, are evaluated. 
Although qualitative and quantitative assessments have 
the same aim - to evaluate dependability -, they differ sig-
nificantly in several aspects, such as: (i) application scope, 
from simple to complex systems; (ii) input data, by assum-
ing distinct assumptions about their attributes; (iii) output 
data, by producing data with different characteristics and  
precision degrees; (iv) lifecylce stage employment, from 
design to commissioning. Therefore, it is necessary to have 
detailed knowing about the main factors that support the 
implementation of the assessment methods, to perform an 
adequate choosing of the most appropriate one [11]. These 
factors can be presented as following: 
• System Structure: It is fundamental to have a com-
plete understanding of the engineering implications 
of the system. This implies to know how the system 
operates, to identify the ways in which it can fail 
(failure modes) and to deduce the consequences of 
these failures (severity, risk factor, degraded ser-
vice, etc.). To accomplish these tasks is necessary, 
from a dependability viewpoint, to know the system 
structure. This will help to identify the most impor-
tant system elements, their behavior and respective 
interactions. From a structural viewpoint, the system 
is observed as a set of components bound together 
in order to interact [12]. A component is another 
system and the recursion stops when a system is 
considered as being atomic, i.e. indivisible. Another 
perspective [2], closer from an engineering view-
point, decomposes the system into four embedded 




units are used; (ii) modules, units are built from 
modules; (iii) components, models are built from 
components. Both viewpoints define a hierarchical 
structure, which enables the establishment of sev-
eral analysis layers, and permits the use of the most 
appropriate evaluation method at each one. At a 
layer, dependability evaluation uses data from the 
previous one and provides data to the next. Some 
structural aspects should have a special attention, 
such as: (i) redundancy employment at the different 
levels, active or standby; (ii) behavior of the fault 
treatment mechanisms (e.g. reconfiguration when a 
failure occurs); (iii) component interactions (e.g. 
dependency). 
• Fault Characterization: Faults and their sources are 
extremely diverse. A current classification [3], 
shows five main viewpoints, which are: phenome-
nological cause, nature, phase of creation or of oc-
currence, limits with respect to the system bounda-
ries and temporal persistence. From a dependability 
evaluation viewpoint, the most important fault at-
tributes are related with their stochastic nature, such 
as: (i) inter-arrival distribution, which establishes 
the time interval between fault occurrences; (ii) 
temporal persistence, from transient to permanent 
faults; (iii) correlation, from independent failures, 
affecting just one component to common-cause 
failures, affecting simultaneously several compo-
nents (iv) coverage factors, related with the effi-
ciency of the error processing and fault treatment 
mechanisms. The previous characterization enables 
the establishment of a fault model. 
• External Actions: System dependability can be im-
proved by repairing a failed component, by per-
forming preventive maintenance or by stocking 
spares for future repairs/maintenances. From a de-
pendability evaluation viewpoint, these actions are 
characterized by: (i) repair/maintenance interval, 
which defines the time necessary to repair/between 
maintenance actions, of a component; (ii) re-
pair/maintenance scope, local (component) versus 
global (system); (iii) characteristics (e.g. number, 
type, etc.) of resources available to perform these 
actions. 
From the previous data, a dependability model that de-
scribes the behavior of the components of the system and 
their interactions is developed. This model can be either, 
functional, more appropriate to a qualitative evaluation, or 
analytical, to a quantitative evaluation. In the former case, 
the model is processed to obtain expressions and values of 
the dependability measures of the system. 
Modeling Techniques 
Several modeling techniques to perform dependability 
evaluation by developing a mathematical representation of 
the system are available: 
A. Basic Probability Theory 
B. Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) 
C. Network Modeling 
D. Fault and Event Trees Analysis (FTA, ETA) 
E. Markov Modeling 
F. Stochastic Petri Nets 
G. Stochastic Simulation 
H. Fuzzy Possibility Theory 
 
Industrial automation systems dependability is typically 
evaluated through the use of a methodology that typically 
requires a quantitative assessment of dependability attrib-
utes, such reliability (MTTF – Mean Time to Failure) and 
availability (MTBT – Mean Time Between Failures) [2].  
From a dependability viewpoint, these systems also pre-
sent complex interactions between system components (e.g. 
multiple failures, repairs) that must be taking into account 
to establish an accurate model. Therefore, dependability 
modeling techniques must be powerful enough to allow the 
inclusion of these scenarios. Since these models could be 
complex, the use of simulation techniques could be hard to 
apply, due to the amount of time needed to obtain results. 
Therefore, it would be preferable to use analytical tech-
niques since the results are easy to obtain. Nevertheless, it 
is important to notice that analytical techniques have a 
more limited modeling power than simulation, which is can 
be overcome by using simpler, but sufficiently accurate and 
representative, model. 
In this context, the modeling techniques should be re-
stricted to those that provide quantitative assessments and a 
high modeling power (E and F). 
Among the dependability modeling techniques pre-
sented, Stochastic Petri Nets (SPN) become in the last dec-
ade a widely used framework for the performance and de-
pendability evaluation of various kinds of systems by sev-
eral reasons: (i) an intuitive description of the system be-
havior; (ii) representation of complex systems by very com-
pact models; (iii) hierarchical modeling; (iv) a formal basis; 
(v) full representation of stochastic processes; (vi) 
analytical and/or simulation solutions (vii) large number of 
tools available. Therefore, SPNs appears as a very promis-
ing and powerful modeling technique to perform depend-
ability evaluation, and the models further proposed will be 
based on this modeling technique [13]. 
Since fieldbus networks are mainly presented on indus-
trial automation systems, their dependability assessment 
methods are inherited from those types of systems. 
Dependability Models 
Several approaches to tackle fieldbus dependability 
evaluation have been proposed, through the definition of 
adequate models. 
Some approaches proposes dependability models of the 
behavior of the Profibus Data Link Layer (FDL) protocol 
when submitted to several types of faults, affecting com-
munication [9][14]. This methodology has the advantage to 
establish an accurate fault behavior of the FDL protocol, 
but imposing some difficulties in using it on a hierarchical 
modeling (since these are simulation models). In this sce-




would be very difficult (or even impossible) due to the 
complexity of the FDL protocol, unless if simpler, but rep-
resentative of the most important fault behavior, models are 
used [14][15]. 
Other approaches consider the fieldbus as a sub-system 
embraced into a wider system, in which their macro-
behavior, from a dependability viewpoint, is considered 
[14][16][17]. In this case only the high level fieldbus fail-
ures that affect the system are modeled, hiding less relevant 
details of the FDL protocol behavior. This approach has 
important benefits such: (i) the global system behavior can 
be full analyzed, (ii) it results on an analytical model; (iii) 
less experimental data is necessary to establish a realistic 
model. The use of a reduced fieldbus dependability model 
can be full justified by two reasons: (i) it is sufficiently ac-
curate and representative of the main fault conditions; (ii) 
the huge time scale differences between fault occur-
rences/external actions and the FDL protocol behavior. 
From previous discussion, the use of an analytical model 
of the latter type (sub-system) is intended to use on de-
pendability evaluation. Experimental data obtained through 
the fault injection methodology previously described, it will 
be used to establish the necessary parameters of the analyti-
cal model. The model computation will both enable to 
evaluate a large number of dependability attributes and to 
identify the most important parameters. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
In this paper it is addressed the need for dependability 
analysis of the PROFIBUS network, and the problems of 
the inaccessibility and performance degradation when it is 
affected by faults.  
Some discussion on dependability evaluation is struc-
tured in order to clarify how to proceed in order to validate 
models and associated techniques. 
A set of dependability parameters and performance met-
rics are identified. The WCET fault coverage factor within 
real distributed control systems are discussed as needing to 
be experimentally evaluated. 
To obtain the referred parameters an infrastructure to in-
ject faults in PROFIBUS networks was developed. The in-
frastructure and the presented methodology constitute the 
framework to research the PROFIBUS protocol behavior 
under well defined fault scenarios.  
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